<u>*Research Article*</u>

Reassessing the Concept of Peace in the Concert of Europe: A European Model of Security Based upon Cooperation of States against People

Burak Samih Gülboy[1]

Abstract

Concert of Europe was a system that was built for the purpose of maintaining the status quo between the European states and the means by which the system rested were constructed during the course of the Congress of Vienna. The Holy Alliance and the Quadruple Alliance (later Quintet) not only enabled Europe's Great Powers to cooperate in building and maintaining order, but also succeeded in creating common values that would keep cooperation alive.

While the liberal and nationalist ideas brought by the French Revolution and spread by Napoleon's campaigns were alive both in European societies and on the political map drawn by Napoleon in 1815, the victorious major powers were aware that the peace was to be established both by the suppression of these ideas and by reformation of the map. For this reason, the absolutist values and structure before the French Revolution formed the reference points that would form the basis of the new peace.

This article aims to analyze the peace on which the so-called European Harmony is based, within the framework of international relations literature.

Keywords: Concert of Europe, Congress of Vienna, Peace, Napoleon, 19th Century

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
<u>*Araştırma Makalesi*</u>

Avrupa Ahengi'nde Barış Kavramının Yeniden Değerlendirilmesi: Halklara Karşı Devletlerin İşbirliğine Dayalı Bir Avrupa Güvenlik Modeli

Burak Samih Gülboy[1]

Öz

Avrupa Ahengi, dayanak noktaları Napolyon Savaşları'nın sonunda toplanan Viyana Kongresi sürecinde yapılanmış olan bir statükoya dayalı bir düzen içinde inşa olan bir barış düzeniydi. Kutsal İttifak ve Dörtlü İttifak (sonradan Beşli), içerikleri itibariyle, yalnızca Avrupa'nın Büyük Güçlerinin düzenin inşası ve korunması yönünde iş birliğine gitmelerini sağlamakla kalmadı, aynı zamanda da, iş birliğini canlı tutacak ortak değerler de yaratmayı başardı.

Fransız Devrimi'nin getirdiği ve Napolyon'un seferlerinin Avrupa toplumlarına yaydığı liberal ve milliyetçi fikirler 1815'te hem Avrupa toplumlarında ve hem de Napolyon tarafından güçle çizilmiş olan siyasi haritada canlıyken, galip devletler Napolyon sonrasında kurulacak barışın hem bu fikirlerin bastırılması ve hem de haritanın yeniden organize edilmesi ile olacağının farkındaydılar. Bu nedenle de Fransız Devrimi'nin öncesindeki monarşi temelli muhafazakâr değerler ve yapı yeni barışın temelini oluşturacak olan referanslar noktalarını oluşturdu.

Bu makale söz Avrupa Ahengi'nin üzerine kurulu olduğu barışı uluslararası ilişkiler literature çerçevesinde analiz etmeyi amaçlamaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Avrupa Ahengi, Viyana Kongresi, Barış, Napolyon, 19. Yüzyıl

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1. Introduction

After the 30 Years' War and the Peace of Westphalia, European politics were toned upon the relations of absolute sovereigns who claimed to take their authorities from God. In such a sense, both war and peace and thus the stability of the European system which was based on the balance of power was conducted concerning the principles related to monarchial absolutism. The high tide of absolute monarchy constituted the basis of peace in 18th century Europe.

The French Revolution in 1789 was a great shock to the European commonwealth which was built on the principle of monarchy. The Revolution not only did bring down the French monarchy but replaced it with a republic in which sovereignty was claimed to rest on the people's will. Upon such a new claim to define politics, the European system faced a contradiction between republican and monarchial claims. The contradiction was transformed into antagonism with the start of the French Revolutionary Wars and the antagonism was escalated when Napoleon came to power in France. This antagonism destroyed the very means upon which the European peace was built. Not until 1815, European powers were able to establish a common ground to constitute a peace that would regulate the European system to perform favorably and securely for the European states.

Once the common enemy (Napoleon) was dealt with, the major European powers turned upon the old ways of imperial diplomacy in Vienna in which balance of power was the basis. However, the experience of Napoleon's momentarily returning to power during his final 100 Days Campaign proved that the threat to order was beyond him but it was the ideologies of the French Revolution. Therefore the major powers in Vienna, stuck together to build a peace that not only stabilize the post-Napoleonic European order but also built a new peace that would rest on a balance of the values of the pre-French Revolutionary regimes and the logic of the anti-Napoleonic Coalition.

What came out of the Congress of Vienna was to determine both the dynamics of the order of the European system in the 19th Century and the fractures which would eventually cause the European Concert to fail in the long run. It was in that sense this article aims to discuss the content of the peace which was designed in process of the Congress of Vienna.

2. The Concept of Peace

The concept of peace is a paradoxical notion for IR discipline. Major IR theories discuss the concept from the perspectives of the paradigms that they propose and usually, the concept of peace is proffered as an environment in which either conflict does not exist or simply appears harmless for an achieved order. Not surprisingly, in the case of IR, the concept of peace is generally defined in close relation to the concept of war. So basically, traditional peace studies either focus on the disturbance of the peace by an outbreak of war or a post-war development to achieve order which has been broken by the recent conflict. The former is the subject of the field which focuses on "the causes of war" and the latter is quite about "peace-building". However, these topics represent the processes in which peace is broken or achieved. A wider perspective is essential to analyze the outcome of these processes.

The primary aim of this study is to analyze the structure of a model of peace that has been specifically designed for collective security. Though the Concert of Europe was an achievement that had been organized by the end of the Napoleonic Wars and yet it was a post-war order that achieved a level of great power-based collective security for Europe, it was structured on transnational security definitions, rather than international ones. This major characteristic of the Concert was often overshadowed by state-based conservative theories which focus on interaction between states or simply define states are the primary actors of IR.

From a different perspective, this study would focus on the interaction of the states in founding common grounds to define a common enemy: their subjects or simply the people they govern.

This study does not persist in an argument on reaching a universal definition for the concept of peace.[1] On the contrary, defining the concept will be omitted. Instead, the specific dynamics that are given by Oliver P. Richmond as the characteristics of the way peace is generally thought and deployed in IR will be taken into account to form the basis of the analysis.[2] They would be tested within the framework of the Concert of Europe which constituted the post-Napoleonic peace of Europe.

3. Concert of Europe: Restoration in Peace or Reconstruction for Peace?

Concert of Europe represents an era of the 19th century in which major European states cooperated to resolve their conflicts through negotiation rather than employing the use of arms. Usually, it is widely accepted that this era was the triumph of diplomacy rather than the use of war. The system rested on close interaction and mostly cooperation between the major powers in order to achieve order through extensive negotiation. For the lesser powers, Interventionism was the basic tool which the major power employed to any state that tended to deviate from the agreed value structure of the concert system.

The concert was a hierarchy in which five major powers form the core of the European political system (Bridge and Bullen, 1980: 2). The other European states were considered secondary. Especially the realist theory is keen to find models of conflict prevention and resolution between the major states in the form of a balance of power or actor representation. Indeed the concert rested on delicate checks and balances of interests between the great powers of post-Napoleonic Europe which derived from the compromises made in the Congress of Vienna. Although subjected to academic debate, It is suggested that the Holy Alliance and the Quadruple Alliance (which transformed to Quintet in 1818) were the basis of the system, and also these agreements are referred to construct the structure on which the concert rested (Chapman, 1998:60).

Though historical approaches to the Concert of Europe refer to topics such as balance of power, the rise of international law, and the emergence of international institutionalism, all these concepts appear to be subjects of academic debate. (See: Holbraad, 1971) One such controversy is the Taylor-Schroeder debate (Blanning, 1994). While Taylor argues that post-Vienna alliances aimed to restore the pre-Napoleonic balance of power of the European political

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[1] Several definitions may be found for Peace in Christopher E. Miller, A Glossary of Terms and Concepts in Peace and Conflict Studies, Ed: Mary E. King, 2nd Edition, University for Peace, p.55-56.

[2] These characteristics are as follows:
1. Peace is always aspired to and provides an optimum, though idealistic, point of reference;
2. It is viewed as an achievable global objective, based on universal norms;
3. It is viewed as a geographically bounded framework defined by territory, culture, identity and national interests;
4. It is presented as an objective truth, associated with complete legitimacy;
5. It is related to certain ideology or political or economic framework;
6. It is viewed as a temporal phase;
7. It is based upon state or collective security;
8. It is based upon local, regional or global forms of governance, perhaps defined by a hegemonic actor or a specific multilateral institution;
9. It is viewed as a top-down institutional framework or a bottom up civil society-oriented framework;
10. There needs to be little discussion of the conceptual underpinnings of peace because it is one ideal liberal form,
11. Most thinking about peace in IR is predicated on preventing conflict, and at best creating an externally supported peace, not creating a self-sustaining peace.
Oliver P. Richmond, Peace in International Relations, London, Routledge, 2008, p. 8.

system which the scheme finally developed into a great power rivalry finalized by the First World War; Schroeder argued that the post-Napoleonic European system was transformed from the classical balance of power to a sort of hierarchy which great powers construct a form of political equilibrium, transforming the balance to a level of cooperation (Taylor, 1953; Schroeder, 1994; also see: Schroeder, 1989, 1992, November 1994, 2001; Levy, 1994, Kissinger, 1956)) Thus Taylor's approach serves the basis for Anglo-Saxon traditional international relations theorization. On the contrary, Schroeder's argument stands quite related to European political science doctrine. Here referring to an old echo may draw a line between, Quoting from Robert Mowatt:

> *"There are two outstanding points of the Congress of Vienna. In the first place, it was not a 'Peace Congress', because peace had already been made at Paris, and all the questions at issue between France and the Allies had been definitely settled. The state of war had ceased both in fact and in law, and France, when the Congress of Vienna met, could claim to associate with other Powers as regular member of the European States-system.*

> *The second outstanding point is that the Congress of Vienna did not meet to make a new world out of the old; if anyone had said that in twenty years of warfare the old European system had collapsed beyond repair, the Congress Powers would have denied it; they believed that the old European system had been a stable thing which on the whole had satisfied the needs of mankind, both for law and for liberty; and so they meant not to reconstruct a new system but to restore the old."* (Mowatt, 1922:4-5).

Analyzing Mowat's lines, two important results may be pointed out. First, as seen above, almost all historical approaches refer to the achievements of Vienna settlements as state-centric. Any achievement during the construction of the concert came to life by the effort of European states, for the sake of the European states, and with the involvement of the European states to reach an environment in which no state seeks any self-interest which may harm others own. In such an understanding European states hold their grounds as the main actors, players of European politics which had been challenged by the chaos of the French revolution. Second, as Mowat pointed out, post-Vienna achievements were a process, an attempt to the restoration of a previous system which turned out to be a construction of a new one. What was aimed to be restored but actually reconstructed?

"Restoration" has attribution to the history of the Congress of Vienna as it is referred to the reforming of the French monarchy (twice) after the abdication of Napoleon. Apart from France, many other monarchies that were brought down by Napoleon were restored. Perhaps it should be noted that though Napoleon was an important anti-hero of monarchy-biased Europe, it was in that sense his title, as well as himself, that were the primary threats to the system. As "Emperor" of the "people"- not the king of his subjects-, he led a crusade against the monarchies of the "holy" and almost transformed two-thirds of Europe and it was in this sense, that European monarchies fought back to beat a man of revolution against the previous order rather than a revolutionary state (Grab, 2003: 2-3; Kissinger, 1957:106).

Perhaps it would be proper to indicate that Concert of Europe was an establishment over the damaged Westphalian system which could not adapt itself to the rapid deterioration of the monarchial legitimacy after the French Revolution. When France became a republic in 1793, other European states which were institutionalized with royal family ties were helpless to communicate with her in traditional ways of diplomacy. The common diplomatic values that had helped to work out in nearly every crisis since 1648, which were based on dynastic kinship,

were utterly disturbed. (Black,1999: 169-171) The crisis meant a strike to the sense of Westphalian diplomacy. As diplomacy lost its power of communication, war remained the only instrument to communicate with a different identity. The Revolutionary Wars of the first coalitions clearly marked that monarchies of Europe couldn't find terms of peace that could rest on a strong basis by using the old means which they had been familiar since 1648. (Black, 1988)

The idea of a usurper fared far worse for European monarchies than the idea of people ruling themselves. When Napoleon declared himself as "Emperor", he was anything else but a royal. Once again royal houses of Europe were hapless to communicate with a ruler who claims to take his power from people and revolution. For other royal houses of Europe, Napoleon was not legitimate in any sense within the European commonwealth. So he sought legitimacy by using force and while doing that, he took the legitimacy he rested on to any new territory he won, thus destroying the old rule and building his scheme. (Lee, 1982:18) By 1810, almost 2/3 of Europe was transformed to a Napoleonic spectrum of Napoleonic kings and national states (Schneid, 2008). Even when the treaty of Chaumont which pawed way to the Congress of Vienna was signed, Napoleonic states still stood strong.

The Congress of Vienna's primary agenda was reshaping the map of Europe which was devastated by Napoleon by the utilization of national terms. The Federation of Rhine, Duchy of Warsaw, Kingdom of Westphalia and the Kingdom of Italy were such entities. Though the Congress intended to reshape the map in a way that can both fulfill the interest of the major powers and in doing so, it was believed that such a map would serve in keeping them in cooperation against any further attempt for hegemony over Europe, but actually, there were hard lines between the Great Powers' expectations. However, Napoleon's escape from Elba and his 100 Days Campaign proved effectively that the spirit of nationalism was still present and above all the revolutionary spirit was alive in masses. Therefore his final defeat and abdication were followed by anti-Napoleonic statements which not condemned Napoleon or French Revolution but referred to the values of pre-Napoleonic era. These were the Holy Alliance and the Quadruple Alliance which the former was based on arguments of legitimacy crowned by an extreme conservative spirit and the latter on diplomatic cooperation on isolating France who still seemed prone to nationalist and revolutionary spirit.

Signed on 18 September 1815, the Holy Alliance was a proclamation of the three East European monarchies which rested on the royal houses of Habsburg, Hohenzollern, and Romanov. The scheme of the alliance was proposed by Alexander I of Russia and appeared as a manifesto of absolute monarchy as its content refers to a spectrum from the divine right of the kings that appear in the Holy Scriptures to Christianity's value system in which a king should rule with justice and love his subjects as the shepherd of his flock or father of his family. (Mowatt, 1922: 23-24; Rich, 1992: 25-26) The alliance was proposed as a spiritual bonding of the three sects of Christianity by bonding three absolute monarchs through the fraternity. By the contract they made, all three monarchs accepted each other as equals and as brothers and promised to rule their subjects in ways of Christianity's charity, justice, and peace and promised to stay in bond to help each other to fulfill the role given to them by God. In such bonding, the parties accepted to employ any forceful measurement only in case of helping one another.

The content of the Holy Alliance was a manifesto on the legitimacy of the absolute monarchy's sovereignty over the domain and the people who had recently lived quite different experiences from the beginning of the French Revolution and through the experience of the Napoleonic Wars. Almost all European powers were forced to muster huge armies to fight against the citizens in arms of the French Republic and then Napoleon's multi-national French Empire. Such an experience had transformed the submissive subjects of the monarchial regimes

into a higher consciousness of liberty and a sense of nationality. It was in that sense the eastern monarchies found a common ground in which they sense the same enemy, not in form of a state or a ruler but a bunch of ideas that had been spread all around by the previous experiences. Thus peace had to be developed on this very same common ground by building an anti-liberal and anti-nationalist bloc against any attempt that would come within the people that monarchies rule. As the three monarchs of Russia, Austria and Prussia formed the foundation of the contract, all European states were called to adhere to the principles of the contract and in doing so be accepted to the accord as equals. Except for England which could not fit the rhetoric of the alliance as it was a liberal monarchy, all the others responded positively to the call and signed the alliance. After the restoration of the French monarchy, the Holy Alliance was the second successful formation of restoration and in that very same sense, its content was the basis which peace was built upon. In a final attempt, England was made fit to the new peace through Quadruple Alliance that was signed on 20 November 1815, which refers France as a rouge state for European peace but has no other content about what Holy Alliance was based on. Finally, peace was brought back to Europe.

4. Analyzing the European Peace in post Vienna Era

The context of the analysis of the framework of the peace which persisted in the post-Vienna status quo in Europe given below benefits from the basic characteristics of the concept of peace that were put forward by Oliver Richmond. (Richmond, 2008:8) In that sense, his proposed sequence will be followed.

1) "Peace is always aspired to and provides an optimum, though idealistic, point of reference" (Richmond, 2008):

In the case of the Concert of Europe, the Congress of Vienna was the peace-building congress because peacemaking was already achieved by the previous Chaumont Treaty and Paris Treaty. ." (Mowatt, 1922:4). Even the 100 Days Campaign of Napoleon did not make any difference and the Second Paris Treaty marked the final peace accord of the Napoleonic Wars. Therefore Congress of Vienna gathered not in a sense of ending a conflict but rather to construct a stable post-conflict order. Though the Quadruple Alliance may be regarded as the final formation of the great power club with the inclusion of Britain in the European system, the characteristics of the system were already defined by the contents of the Holy Alliance. Thus, the Holy Alliance constituted the point of reference for the fundamentals of the new peace that was being established. While referring to Christian values and in a way Christian political hierarchy, the primary signatory monarchies constructed a sense of conservatism by overruling the basic concepts introduced by the French Revolution and effectively used by Napoleon: equality, liberty, and fraternity of the people which would have forced the legitimacy of the absolute monarchies of Europe. Instead of such universal mottos, sovereign equality and the fraternity of monarchs was proposed but liberty was limited to the values of Christianity which kings should be just, and in that sense, every king ought to help other to fulfill his role. The primary and idealistic reference to peace in the Concert of Europe was on the legitimacy of the absolute monarchs who based their sovereign rights on the divine values of Christianity (Kissinger, 1957: 189). Not surprisingly, through the signature of the Holy Alliance, the status of the people was degraded from citizenship to subjects within the scope of the accord and the spirit of absolutism prevailed.

2) "Peace is viewed as an achievable global objective, based on universal norms" (Richmond, 2008):

The conditions which prepared the Holy Alliance presented a chaotic breakdown of the Westphalian state system. Since 1648, European states developed instruments for interaction

that had been associated with dynastic interaction through marriages of royal houses. As monarchs reigned supreme, the European system turned into a power hierarchy in which five major royal houses dominated the continent's balance of power. The 18th Century's dynastic wars created a system of balance in which no state can dominate the system single handily. Therefore five great powers rose to play the part as the major actors: Britain, France, Russia, Austria, Prussia, and Russia.

However, the structure, on which the European system was based, was disturbed by the French Revolution and finally brought down by Napoleon's imperial reign. Except for Russia and England, almost all European states suffered under Napoleon's yoke. Napoleon had misplaced traditional monarchies, replaced them with constitutional regimes, redrew the borders which remain intact for hundred years, and subdued great powers to himself by unequal treaties, stripping their ability to act for their interest. (Schroeder, 1990) By the treaty of Tilsit in 1806, Prussia became a lost its status as a great power and by the treaty of Schönbrunn in 1809, Austria met the same end. By 1810, the hierarchy and balance of the previous era were utterly destroyed (Lee, 1982: 22).

It was in that sense Congress of Vienna gathered to create a new peace that would omit Napoleon's deeds. Though such were the intentions, the victors were aware that the European map was utterly changed by the creation of Napoleonic client states which were based on constitutional regimes and above all established to some extent in a national sense. Such a situation necessitated a radical redrawing of the map by destroying these formations. In that sense, the decision-makers of the congress referred to the monarchial values of the previous system as the universal norm. Therefore before the removal of the Napoleonic states from the map, the previous monarchial regimes that were removed by Napoleon were restored to their thrones. Such a restoration reformed a vision of the pre-French Revolution Europe where all states were familiarized to share the same type of regime in which they used to interact flawlessly. In such a sense, restoration also meant the restoration of the norms of the pre-French Revolution European system. (For details see: Schroeder, 1994: 495-516)

It has to be stated that the monarchial restorations were movements from above. Though there were obvious nationalist and liberal predispositions in almost any state in Europe, there was no intention of asking for the consent of the people who were supposed to be the submissive subjects. This was why the Holy Alliance strongly referred to the absolutist Christian values for the legitimization of the restored and ongoing monarchies.

3) "Peace is viewed as a geographically bounded framework defined by territory, culture, identity, and national interests" (Richmond, 2008):

The geographically bounded framework of peace in the case of the Concert of Europe was somehow driven by both individual and common interests of the four powers of Europe, namely Britain, Russia, Austria, and Austria. In the case of both individual and common interests, the power distribution between the major European powers was problematic. The flanking superpowers of the concert were the strongest and thus had the maximum means, in terms of geography and material, to exercise their "power". As Britain emerged with a chain of important station islands that could control the whole sea lanes, this involvement enabled the British navy to become not the only major naval arm in the world but also a system control instrument; an instrument which Britain would regularly be using in the forthcoming system-level crises. The same was true with Russia but from a different perspective. Covering nearly 1/3 of the Eurasian continent and relying upon a massive population and the strongest land force, Russia could exercise her "power" in any land around it. Thus the means that made Britain and Russia "super powers", also made them "world powers".

Despite the vision that these two superpowers had, the triple powers located in the center of the continent were "locals" in accordance with Britain's and Russia's scope. France's lost overseas assets in the Congress of Vienna gave Britain a distant advantage over the command of the seas. Also being the most mistrusted partner of the new order, France was politically isolated. Imprisoned in the center of the continent and surrounded by problematic regions which had to be handled in some kind of policies so they do not affect her infrastructure, Austria was and had been the central power of European politics. However, a steady decline since the Thirty Years' War was in progress which had shrunk the old kingdom's political choices to a minimum. Prussia was the weakest link, the smallest and also looking the most unfortunate state both in means and in comparison with the central powers. The only chance of her survival -a unification of the German states- had been frustrated in the outcome of the Congress of Vienna in which a German Confederacy was created upon lands that Prussia had claimed her sphere of influence.

In such a structure of power distribution, it was obvious peace would be limited to a geographical definition. Such a definition emerged on dropping the individual claims and joining a common one. In that sense, both Britain and Russia joined the concert in case of continental issues. Britain synchronized herself to the continental peace but followed her way on issues of non-continental problems, as in the case of Spanish claim on her ex-Latin American territories. Russia gave concessions in case of Poland. Prussia backed any attempt at German Unification. It could be claimed that the peace of the concert was stuck between the east of the English Channel and the west of Vienna. Out of these borders, it was a matter of individual interactions. The scope of the concert was enclosed to Europe only and from the east of Vienna, the consensus was not valid or at least was to be decided. The concert was also a land-based enterprise and nothing was mentioned about the seas. The Concert promised to act in unison for the fundamentals of the post-Vienna peace but only within the geographical scope that was commonly accepted. That was why it was called the Concert of Europe.

The decision-makers in Vienna in 1815, clearly defined the geography and the fundamentals for the new peace that was being established, both during the congress and afterwards by the supplementary accords. In that sense Quadruple Alliance formed the power equilibrium in which four major powers, though differing in power potentials, recognized each other positions as such, thus forming a great power club over the hierarchy in Europe. Their consent was over one main principle which is to create a common norm to be accepted by all which could surpass their interests. This norm was preserving the status quo and not to act individually but to act together or refer to each other instead, if any kind of threat to the status quo both to the individual or common interests appears (Bridge and Bullen, 1980: 22). However, there was a sharp division in understanding the nature of this norm. The signatory monarchies labeled a conservative identity to peace through restoration which Britain could not synchronize herself with her liberal framework. This was surpassed by the renewal of the Quadruple Alliance in which France was condemned as the rogue state of Europe. Thus the signature of the Quadruple Alliance provided the opportunity for Britain's involvement and leaving the conservative notion of the Holy Alliance aside. In such an understanding the framework of post-Vienna peace was found basis on a collective security in which two definitions are integrated: first, absolutist conservativism against liberalism and nationalism (Russia, Austria, and Prussia) and second, hostility to any power that has any will to change the status quo (Britain). By the Congress of Aux la Chapelle in 1818, France was given a choice to accept the second notion and by her positive approach, she also was accepted to the Great Power Club as the fifth great power of Europe. It could be said with the inclusion of France in 1818 to the concert, it was clear that a sense of collective security was achieved as all major powers relied on accepting the common norm.

Apart from geography and national interests, the peace of the concert was a matter of culture and identity. The context of the Holy Alliance claimed that peace would reign between the Christian kings of Europe, thus any member should fit these definitions. The primary signatories of the Holy Alliance represented Catholicism, Protestantism, and Orthodoxy and in that sense excluded others. In such a sense European peace and concert were formed into an identity of Christendom.(Delfiner, 2003: 133)

4) "Peace is presented as objective truth, associated with complete legitimacy" (Richmond, 2008):

As mentioned before in the previous characteristics 1 and 2, Holy Alliance drew the lines of objective truth and legitimacy on Christian values and divine rights of monarchies. By the restorations of the older regimes to the throne, this was achieved by 1820. The major powers managed to interact closely on the problems which arise on the domain of the restored regimes and intervention by force was a legal option if all major powers approved.

The insistence on absolutism would prove to be problematic as the measures that were taken would not stop the revolutions of 1820, 1830 and 1848. Despite the interventions by major powers, the gap between rulers and the people widened. The mass movements would tumble down the absolute regimes and transform the states of Europe, eventually leading to the emergence of constitutional regimes and reshaping of the European map by nationalist unifications.

5) "Peace is related to a certain ideology or political or economic framework" (Richmond, 2008):

Richard N. Rosecrance argues that ideology and domestic reasons may force states to restrain or limit their usage of power externally (Rosecrance, 2002 :148). The case of Concert of Europe is such a case where the liberal and nationalist rise in Europe was to be restrained by absolutist conservatism. It was evident both liberalism and nationalism was detrimental to all monarchies of continental Europe and was assumed as a common threat.

It should be stated that the elite who gathered together in Vienna in 1815 were all bureaucrats of the previous system based on absolutist values. So the new system which was to be designed in Vienna was supposed to be structured on the context of absolute monarchy. The new system was supposed to work on the glory of Kings, managed by the Kings' men and this should have been done in a way such the states should be represented in the name of royal houses. The notion of "equality of sovereigns" within the context of the Holly Alliance was a deliberate emphasis on the principle of monarchy in which sovereignty rested on royal blood and all royal families enjoyed a divine legitimacy to rule their subjects. Perhaps this may be one of the reasons why Schroeder labels the Concert of Europe not as a balance of power between Britain and Russia but as a political equilibrium of all great powers that were accepted as such (Schroeder,1992: 634-35). After the Congress's final act was declared and the Concert was on its way, almost all the states in Europe were governed by some kind of monarchy and there was not to be any other regime within the European hierarchy until the emergence of the Second Republic.

6) "Peace is viewed as a temporal phase" (Richmond, 2008):

The view of peace as a temporal phase in the case Concert of Europe is twofold. On one side it had an intrastate dimension and on the other side, it has an interstate dimension.

The intrastate dimension should be examined through the rise and fall of absolutism. Peace-building in Vienna was a precarious process and Napoleon's hundred days proved that

the spirit of the French Revolution was still quite alive at least in France. More than that the proposed restorations of the older monarchies and the dissolution of the constitutional Napoleonic states were measures imposed above to the masses in Europe who had experienced nationalism and liberalism to some extent. Therefore a threat of reaction was ever-present from 1815 onwards. Austrian Chancellor Klemens von Metternich took the upper hand countering any opposition to absolutism. However, he was aware that the masses who called for liberalism could not be kept at bay for so long but he believed that such reform could only be introduced by the rulers and any attempt from below meant not only revolution but the dissolution of the existing European system.

What comforted Metternich most was Tsar Alexander I's position as the champion of the idea of a interventionism on international basis. Alexander was keen on building an international police force to be used against any revolutionary attempt within the borders that the concert was present (Seaman, 1955: 12-13). Though, Alexander's initial proposal to use Russian army as an international force for intervention was declined in Aix La Chapelle, he never gave up his insistence on building an international police force which would stay on guard against any revolutionary attempt. It was both Britain's opposition and other major power's suspicion of Alexander's probable use of interventions for a possible European hegemony that ended the idea of an international police force. Finally the British proposal which suggested that any intervention should be made by a neighboring state and by the consent of major powers was accepted (Rich, 1992:33-34).

Between 1820 and 1822, three conferences (Troppau, Laibach, and Verona) took place with the involvement of five major powers of Europe to discuss the measures to be taken against revolutions in Naples and in Spain which had broken out in demands for constitutional regimes. The final decisions that came out of these conferences were interstate interventions in which Austria and France took the field and restoring order by using their military assets over their own borders.

However in 1830, Britain and France intervened in favor of Belgium's uprising, liberating Belgium from Holland. This intrastate intervention was quite problematic as it was motivated with nationalism and more the governance of Belgium and Holland was given to Orange Dynasty in the Congress of Vienna. Despite King William's resistance on accepting the accession of Belgium from his rule, Britain and France engineered Belgium's liberation both by using diplomacy and force. As Russia, Prussia and Austria was involved with the simultaneous uprising in Poland, they gave little resistance to the case of Belgium. However, it could be argued that the controversial outcomes of Belgian and Polish uprisings effectively divided the Concert of Europe to two different spheres: liberal west and conservative east.

In October 1833 with the signature of the Berlin Convention (or the so-called Second Münchengrätz Treaty), which referred to the content of the Holy Alliance, Russia, Austria, and Prussia agreed to support each other by any necessary means to surpass any revolutionary effort regardless of being liberal or national within their borders. Though this protocol provided Russian assistance to Austria in 1848 in case of the Hungarian Revolution, the peace which was based on a quintal understanding of the concert was so disturbed that no evidence of the absolutist spirit of Vienna remained. By the revolutions of 1848, except for Russia, almost all states of the concert were transformed into constitutional regimes.

The interstate level of the temporal phase of the Concert of Europe should be examined through the clash of common and individual interests of the major European powers. Vienna accords aimed at preserving the peace by compelling the major powers of Europe to congresses in which each can negotiate their interest until a common point of view is reached through

meditation. This was a proven instrument of the Westphalian system to end wars, however, in the case of the Concert of Europe, such meetings were gathered as a potential danger of conflict occurs. Thus the use of arms was left as the last resort. The interstate dimension of peace relied on diplomacy as the powers were keen to stay away from a multisided major European war. The concert was a consensus but limited to an era in which the power distribution was assumed to stay as it was. Quoting from Seaman:

"The fault of the Vienna statesmen is not that they put the clock back in 1815 (at least they did so in the sense that Napoleon may be said to have caused it to move fast); their error was that they hoped to keep the clock stopped at 1815 for the next half of the century" (Seaman, 1955: 6).

The individual efforts of Britain and France during the Belgian Revolution and in the Carlist Wars during the 1830s injured the consensus on which the Quintal Alliance rested, effectively dividing European Concert into two blocs, liberal West and Conservative East, diminishing the collective spirit.

7) "Peace is based upon state or collective security" (Richmond, 2008):

All this structural analysis leads to one single proposition that what came out of the Congress of Vienna was an effort simply to restore the so-called balance of power that had existed in the pre-French Revolution European political map. The alliances that had crowned the Final Act of Vienna represented what Hedley Bull had described as a "contrived balance of power", a balance that comes out of "conscious policies" (Bull, 1978:104). Lee simply states that "The Concert of Europe is the term used to describe various attempts made by the major powers to co-operate, after 1815, in settling possible causes of conflict between themselves in order to prevent the possibility of another large-scale war." (Lee, 1982: 37). Even though the hierarchy of the old system took possession of the fight against an enemy who threatens to redistribute the roles of the actors within the system and successfully won it, there was not much success in preventing the damage which was caused by the echoes of the French Revolution and what Napoleon tried to materialize out of these. So in Vienna, major powers varying in status and skills came together not only to secure peace against an oppressor or not only to try to find a way to handle things without intervening with military assets but trying to secure themselves from the outcome of a new map and more a new community of people that they need to govern.

In other words, revolution was the main threat to the major powers, a stronger threat than a large-scale European war. The main shreds of evidence of the threat that forced the major powers to cooperate can be found in the establishment of the coalitions and the alliances that formed the backbone of the Concert of Europe. The Quadruple Alliance and the Holy Alliance which were signed during the Congress pointed out one common enemy in different versions.

First, the common enemy to the post-Vienna order materialized as people of France. Initially Talleyrand was successful in persuading Alexander that French people can not be held responsible of Napoleon's actions and thus obtaining France a somehow generous peace by the Treaty of Paris in May 1814. However his claims proved wrong when Napoleon escaped from his exile in Elba and waged his 100 Days Campaign with full support of the French people. This proved that more than Napoleon, France still stood as the center of revolution and revolutionary ideas seem to be alive within the French nation. It was in that sense the Holy Alliance determined the anti-liberal and anti-nationalist statements which present the basis of post-Napoleonic conservatism. However it was essential that Britain with its liberal regime did not fit this conservatism and much was needed to establish a united great power bloc.

It was clear that the Holy Alliance was not alone enough to build a common ground for great powers to collaborate in case of order building. This was successfully exploited by Talleyrand in Vienna. Talleyrand's success during the initial phase of the Vienna Congress enabled France an established position as the great powers were divided upon the making of the post war map. Talleyrand's negotiation on a proposal for an Anglo-Austrian-French alliance against Prussia and Russia was materialized as the secret treaty of Vienna in January 1815. At a moment Europe came close to pre-Napoleonic balance of power and This treaty almost guaranteed France position as a great power but Napoleon's escape from Elba and his return to power deteriorated France's position. (Schroeder, 1994: 537-538) The success of great powers in taking collective action against Napoleon's challenge was finalized by the renewal of the Quadruple Alliance in November 1815 in which France was impeached as the enemy of order.

It could be argued that the Holy Alliance condemned the people of France and the Quadruple Alliance confronted French state as the common enemy of the post-Vienna order of Europe. However, The fundamentals of peace that were put into accord in Vienna were not only a simple matter of diminishing the echoes of the French Revolution and Napoleon's deeds. There was also the problem of creating a status quo to suit the territorial changes in the map of Europe. Contrary to the individual interests of the other powers of the concert which possibly stood had the potential to create further conflicts, Austria's individual interests laid in the maintenance of the post-Vienna status quo. Her central position on the map made her multinational population vulnerable to any nationalist claim that could arise within her scope. Also, Habsburg monarchy had developed a stratified structure within her borders which was based on feudal terms rather than national. Therefore any territorial gains would have brought further problems in terms of nationalism but on the other hand, Austria was in need of checking and if possible oppressing both liberal and national claims around her territories in an effort to secure her from possible inner uprisings. On these terms, she was willing to be the designer and prosecutor of the fundamentals of the post-Vienna peace. Thus, Austria took the whole burden to act as the mediator of the new peace but such a burden surpassed her power. It was through the success of the concert that the members had the sense that they needed to construct an imitation of force on behalf of Austria. However, such a construction necessitated cooperation. Therefore the concert found a common interest in giving up individual interests in favor of the common one.

8) "Peace is based upon local, regional, or global forms of governance, perhaps defined by a hegemonic actor or a specific multilateral institution" (Richmond, 2008):

John Ikenberry argues that after major wars, the tendency to build international order increases as states optimize for the new post-war environment. This tendency is based on three dynamics: First, the post war environment necessitates a different order than before as the capacities of the states change, thus the states need to construct new mechanisms to restrain power. Second, the level of power disparities among states and the variety of the types of states precisely affects the international order building. Third, on historical basis, beginning from 1815, a tendency for intergovernmental institutionalism is present in the international system (Ikenberry, 2001, 4-6). This subtopic would discuss post-Vienna peace's order building and Austria's central role.

Clemens von Metternich of Austria was the architect of the Concert. This is fairly true if the Concert is viewed as an obstacle against any claims to absolutism. But it would also be true to analyze the concert as an enterprise of European powers who have found themselves in an atomized state of interests. The Congress showed that all the states, even France, had got what they wanted somehow and the collaboration that had united the anti-French bloc was not

a necessity anymore. Britain and Russia had other interests elsewhere and the central European states were finally settled in a sense of new uneasy peace. The problem rested on building a consensus that on one hand would appease the major powers for focusing on their egocentric interests without creating conflict, and on the other hand, still, maintain the hierarchy which points to every actor's own role within the system.

Most balance of power theorists finds it essential that there should be a manager or a balancer of the balance within the system. This agent has to be a strong player and needs to enter balancing coalitions to counter any threatening single actor or coalition of actors. In other words, peace should be constructed by the guidance of a hegemonic actor to initiate a system of values to create a reference of common interest. There is a strong tendency to observe Britain in the 19th century as the balancer of the post-Napoleonic balance of power established after 1815. However, there had been constant arguments about the structure of the system and its characteristics as a "balance". Though there is enough evidence that British foreign policy many times put up fairly good balancing acts, the system was based on consensus rather than countering oppositions. The consensus was on Austria's "responsibilities" and it was Metternich's both success and perhaps only choice to put on Austria's back such a burden. In such a sense, it could be put forward that The Concert of Europe rested on a set of Austrian responsibilities within the defined geography of the concert: Austria was the politically primary and geographically central actor who was supposed to check Prussia's intensions in uniting the German states, Piedmont's intentions to unite Italy and check France's continental ambitions. Austria was the only European state who could put forth a set of interests that could be shared by other powers, either positively or negatively. The major powers were keen on keeping central Europe under control and securing their backs while their imperial ambitions rested on other horizons, so if Austria's interests were to sustain the environment that they projected, it was rational for them to give back up to Austria. Even though French and Prussian ambitions clashed with Austria's, these states were to be the weakest of the hierarchy in the early days of the concert, thus they could perform their role in the hierarchy until they get the power to overrule it. So the Austrian interests were to be in benefit everyone. On the contrary, Metternich was well aware that the concert was the only chance for Austria's survival as a great power. So he tailored a careful design, a material map, and an abstract set of values for which all members of the hierarchy could find some positive side to their own.

As Ikenberry points out:

> "Rather than rely simply on balance-of-power strategies or preponderant power, they sought to restrain power, reassure weaker potential rivals, and establish commitments by creating various types of binding institutions. The strategy was to tie potentially rival and mutually threatening states together in alliance and other institutions." (Ikenberry, 2001: 8).

The problem that Metternich faced was the lack of a common cause that would put the European state in a consensus for cooperation. So Metternich carved out a value system that could be summarized in two terms: Anti-liberalism and anti-nationalism by giving reference to absolutism. The first two were to serve Russia's point of view and the latter was for Britain who would not accept such a phrase against liberalism but is ambitious to take part in the European hierarchy by accepting the endurance of the monarchial system as her regime type suited the proposed fundamentals. As can be seen, the references that Metternich used were well fit to put two superpowers in a conjunction with Austria's interests. It was also his genius to sustain the interests of Austria that seem to collide with the lesser members of the hierarchy by securing them with the consent of the more powerful members of the hierarchy.

To press the lesser members of the hierarchy into a consensus, a new map and a set of alliances were also designed by Metternich. A German Confederation was established that should rest on an Austrian-Prussian duality that should serve as a barrier against a German unification and any French ambitions over the Catholic German States; Austria was to hold Northern Italy to check any attempt to unify Italy (Bridge and Bullen, 1982: 27-28). These responsibilities were too much for a state whose capabilities had been greatly weakened in terms of all but diplomacy. So the responsibilities of Austria needed to be shared, at least supported. The Quadruple Alliance was the British support and grant for sharing Austria's burden, The Holy Alliance was Russia's and Prussia's. By the Conference of Aix La Chappelle in 1818, France was included in the consensus to share the burden. This was the map that was tailored by Metternich with the expense of giving Austria the role of managing the Concert but taking the burden of sustaining it.

At this point, Schroeder's arguments over the structure of the Concert of Europe gains importance and a reference had to be made to this concern. As Schroeder rejects the proclaims of the balance of power theory labeling the 19th-century European system as a balance of power, he refers to this period as a political equilibrium of great powers (Schroeder, 1989). If the Concert of Europe is taken into consideration, it would be vague to determine the structure of this system as a balance of power and it may lead to false ends for defining the status of being a "great power". The "great power" definition that is needed to be found in the first place is relevant to the characteristics of the outcome of the Congress of Vienna and the diplomatic pacts and alliances that had completed its venture. The Concert at the first glance seemed to be a balance of power; however, it did not fit much to any definition of the theory. It could be argued that bipolarity might be observed as Britain and Russia were the extremist super powers but as long as the area, that the Concert was covering, is concerned, these two powers were not antagonists but rather collaborators. There was no multipolarity either, as the hierarchy was not flexible for the states to seek individual gains within the system's domain. The Concert was indeed a unipolarity in which all the states accepted a common value pack and a rigid hierarchy and the definition of the great power status is very related to this aspect of the system. The states forming the hierarchy were all great powers regardless of their capacities but they were accepted so because of their mutual recognition of this "great power" status each other. It could be said that great power status was recognized from above and for this status to be granted to another, there needed to be a mutual approval of the states who were accepted as the Great Powers.

9) "Peace is viewed as a top-down institutional framework or a bottom up civil society-oriented framework" (Richmond, 2008):

The nature which the concert of Europe was a top-down institutional framework based on the absolute rule of monarchs. As such any bottom-up claim appeared hostile to peace. In such a sense peace was based on the cooperation of states against assumed threats that are probable to appear within the space which they claim to govern. Such an understanding was idealized in Metternich who believed that sovereignty which was embodied in monarchy may not be divided and any reform may be introduced from only above, not by the wish of the society that is being governed. Therefore as in the case of uprisings in Naples and Spain in 1820, any claim for constitutional reform was assumed not as local demands for reform but as direct threats against international peace.

10) "There needs to be little discussion of the conceptual underpinnings of peace because it is one ideal liberal form" (Richmond, 2008):

It is hard to suggest that the underpinnings of peace had a unique definition for all the members of the Concert of Europe; however, each was keen on protecting what come out of it:

the status quo within a defined space. From the onset of the Congress of Vienna, almost all attendants had their individual interests but they were hesitant to insist on any of them as a continuation of war seemed further chaos. This was the main motivation for peace building and on the international level, all the powers of the concert were keen on a cohesive action based on diplomacy rather than the use of arms. However, such a cohesive understanding needed collective comprehension of a set of values that each member of the concert can suit itself. Therefore, peace was built upon backing up from individual interests in favor of a common one. As mentioned previously the context of the Holy Alliance determined the underpinnings of peace for the Eastern monarchies in a conservative manner that rests on absolutism. Further, the Quadruple and the Quintet Alliances brought the Western liberals who could not fit the context of absolutism but found a common understanding for the maintenance of the post-Vienna status quo.

The cooperation, which the underpinnings of the peace had suggested, reached its peak from1818 to 1822 at which all powers of the concert found grounds to present their individual contributions in multilateral congresses but the division between the conservatives and liberals stood strong. Also, there was a power shift within the great powers. The decline of Austria fouled her position as a balancer. Also though cooperated willingly but within their own perceptions on issues within the geography of Europe that the concert defined, both Britain and Russia were hesitant to form blocs of their understandings. Worse both powers proved to be less responsible and self-oriented in supporting Austria's central role in the concert. This was evident in the Greek and Belgian uprisings. Though Metternich managed to sustain the concert by appointing a German King to the recently liberated Greece and therefore broadening the geography of the concert; the liberation of Belgium by British and French intervention destroyed the cohesive understanding of the post-Vienna peace utterly and divided Europe essentially to liberal and conservative blocs.

Finally, the conservative underpinnings of the peace of the concert were against the evolution of the economic and social structures of the member states. Though absolutism proved a tough obstacle against liberal and then national expressions that arose within the societies of Europe, the monarchial regimes also failed to suit the rapid social and economic changes within the space of their sovereignties. Symbolized in Metternich's character, the absolutist practice rested on only using force against the masses. Though the monarchies succeeded in cooperating in the use of force against any opposition from the people, they were ineffective in decreasing the tensions that nourished not because of their inability to react but their inability to evolve. As the cooperation was sacrificed to the individual interests, each power was left alone to struggle with the oppositions that developed within their borders. In 1848, only the most liberal Britain and the most conservative Russia bypassed the revolutions but all the others suffered with which Austria took the heaviest toll. Apart from Russia, as almost all regimes in Europe changed from absolute to constitutional regimes, the fundamentals of post-Vienna peace was no more valid.

11) "Most thinking about peace in IR is predicated on preventing conflict, and at best creating an externally supported peace, not creating self-sustaining peace" (Richmond, 2008):

Post-Vienna peace which developed as the basis of international cooperation of the Concert of Europe was based on the institutionalization of the fundamentals which were closely related to preserving the continuity of regimes that initiated the cooperation. Therefore references to absolutism were intentionally made to form a cohesive group that was assumed to maintain a spirit of common values and thus settle on a common interest which all sides can embrace. In such an understanding, the issue of preventing international conflict was left to collective action against any oppression, against the cooperation and against the common

interest on which the cooperation was built upon. In that sense, the peace had intrastate and interstate levels which the former presented that each member should be guaranteed to maintain her regime to sustain her group identity, and the latter supposed that members sharing the same identity should act upon the preservation of the cooperation which the fundamentals of peace necessitated.

It was evident that any change of regime in any member of the concert would create flaws to the status quo. This was evident in the case of the government change in France in which the Bourbon monarchy was replaced with the Orleans monarchy in 1830. An international intervention was prevented by the new monarchy who proclaimed that the new government strictly accepted the content of the Quintet Alliance of 1818 (Rich, 1992: 58). However as mentioned before, the revolutions of 1848, utterly destroyed the structure of post-Vienna peace as the regimes of Europe transformed into constitutional regimes. The common identity that rested on the similarity of the regimes was no more present.

5. Epilogue: Security through Cooperation: A Two-level Analysis

The eleven characteristics of the peace on which the European concert collectively indicate that the cohesive behavior of the members of the concert rested on their vulnerabilities to the threats that might appear at intrastate and interstate levels. Therefore they had a tendency to build on a consensus in which any member would be satisfied by a set of fundamentals that stem out of the prevention of common possible threats on both levels.

On the intrastate level, the European concert aimed at securing her actors' legitimacy, sovereignty, and integrity by clear references to the Christian values that had dominated European societies' political behavior until French Revolution. Such a reference to religion is closely related to the St Augustinian sense of obedience to any ruler, as long as the order is achieved (Chadwick, 1986: 109-110). However, the context of the Holy Alliance clearly presented references to the 18th century absolutism which was based on the absolute sovereignty of the kings who claim to take their legitimacy from God. Sovereignty could not be divided or shared as it was given to the chosen one through holy ways. Therefore people were merely subjects and were not supposed to take part in the governance of the states which were on the verge of being reorganized on the map. It was clear that such an approach was closely related to the emergence of the liberal and nationalist ideas of the French Revolution which were spread around Europe during the Napoleonic Wars. Almost all European monarchies felt the pressure to mobilize their populations to stand against Napoleon's multinational citizens in arms, creating armies of subjects in arms. Such an experience prepared an environment in which the subjects gained a degree of political consciousness. Though Napoleon was defeated, the ghost of the French Revolution prevailed in almost any part of Europe and it was in that sense the signatory monarchies of Vienna intentionally took the upper hand to restore a system that would put the liberal and national consciousness under pressure within the designed physical borders of the absolute monarchies. Therefore security meant that each individual actor should maintain its governance exactly in the way that was defined by the founding agreement, in that case the Holy Alliance, and any change meant a broken component of the system that needed to be fixed.

The interstate level of the security of the European concert was closely related to the intrastate level. Robert Jervis described the characteristics of the Concert of Europe as:

> "In essence, the concert was characterized by an unusually high and
> self-conscious level of cooperation among the major European powers. The
> states did not play the game as hard as they could; they did not take advantage
> of others' short-run vulnerabilities. In repeated plays of the Prisoners'

Dilemma, then, each state cooperated in the expectation that the others would do the same. Multilateral and self-restrained methods of handling their problems were preferred to the more common unilateral and less restrained methods. " (Jervis, 1985:)

As Jervis pointed out that the European states hesitated to take advantage of their short-run vulnerabilities in favor of cooperation. Such an attitude was closely related to the situation that had been reached in the post-Vienna status quo. Though the restoration unified the regime types of European states on the absolute monarchy, the power distribution between the European states varied sharply. Such a power distribution made it possible for the stronger states to seek their individual goals and this kind of structure clearly symbolized multi-polarity in which stability is weak. As any governmental change in any member of the system was accepted as a threat to security, the interstate intervention was accepted as legitimate. Despite the legitimacy of intervention the individual interests of the stronger powers made such actions problematic. Therefore further cautions were taken during and after the Congress of Vienna in the form of accords that institutionalized the interstate cooperation for security. The Quadruple and Quintet Alliances and the various congresses represented the formation of the great power club in which each member accepted the fundamentals of the status quo that derived from the maintenance of the integrity of the actors within the designed system. In such an understanding, regardless of their power capacity, each member was recognized as an equal to the others.

In other words, the Concert of Europe born out of a hegemony in which the hegemon was not a single power but a group of powers who contributed themselves to a designed peace that rested on the legitimacy of conservatism to defy any intrastate or interstate attempt to destroy the absolutist rule of monarchies in arbitrary defined European borders.

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